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Defining “Regular Occupation” in Long-Term Disability 
Insurance Policies 
Margo Jasukaitis & Daniel O’Hara* 
Abstract: 
Millions of American workers purchase “regular occupation” disability 
insurance to protect against disability-related job loss. Unlike general disability 
insurance policies, which require workers be disabled from doing any job to 
receive benefit payments, “regular occupation” insurance pays benefits when 
workers become disabled from doing their specific job. Whether a disabled worker 
receives benefits under such a plan often turns on how insurers and courts define 
the worker’s “regular occupation.” 
Some Circuits look to the duties, conditions, and experience required to do a 
worker’s job. But others define a worker’s “regular occupation” in generic terms—
even if that description does not accurately capture the person’s work. When a 
worker’s occupation is defined generically, the worker is unlikely to qualify as 
disabled under their insurance plan and thus does not qualify for benefits. The 
divergent interpretations of “regular occupation” insurance plans across circuits 
run headlong into the goals of fair and uniform benefit administration set out in the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). 
This Note argues “regular occupation” must be defined with reference to a 
worker’s actual job requirements. We explore the shortcomings of defining 
“regular occupation” without reference to a worker’s actual job and propose 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is impossible for Juanita Nichols to do her job. Now sixty-two years old, 
Nichols spent her entire career working in a poultry factory.1 Her job involved 
processing raw chicken, a task for which she received industry-specific training 
applicable only to inspecting and processing poultry. Because the work involved 
raw meat, Nichols’ job required she work in near-freezing temperatures all day.2 
Prolonged exposure to this extreme cold caused Nichols to develop Raynaud’s 
disease,3 a circulatory disorder that causes people to lose circulation in their 
extremities when exposed to cold temperatures. Nichols’ diagnosis meant she 
could no longer work in the chicken-processing plant. She was now disabled from 
doing the only job she had ever had. 
Before falling ill, Nichols purchased long-term disability insurance through 
her employer to protect against this exact scenario.4 Her policy provided benefits 
if, as a result of injury or illness, Nichols could not “perform the material duties of 
[] her Regular Occupation.”5 But when Nichols filed a claim for benefits under the 
policy after developing Raynaud’s, her claim was denied.6 
When evaluating whether Nichols was disabled from doing “her Regular 
Occupation,” Reliance Standard Life Insurance (Reliance) defined “regular 
occupation” in terms of how a food processing job was “normally performed in the 
national economy,” not “the way it is performed for a specific employer or in a 
specific locale.”7 In short, Reliance defined “regular occupation” in general terms; 
it did not define Nichols’ “regular occupation” with reference to her specific job 
requirements. 
Without considering any additional information, Reliance defined Nichols’ 
job using a reference manual called the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT). 
The book contained an entry titled “sanitarian, any industry,” which Reliance 
asserted best fit Nichols’ position. The company then used the list of associated 
job duties to assess whether Nichols’ Raynaud’s diagnosis disabled her from 
performing her job. Because the “sanitarian (any industry)” entry did not refer to 
working in the cold, Reliance found Nichols was not disabled and denied her 
benefits.8 Nichols asked Reliance to reconsider, but the insurance company 
concluded “[a]ny exposure to cold temperatures would be job-site specific, rather 
 
 1. Nichols v. Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., 924 F.3d 802, 805 (5th Cir. 2019). 
 2. Nichols v. Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109526, *3 (S.D. Miss. June 
29, 2018) (noting the factory was consistently kept at forty degrees Fahrenheit). 
 3. Nichols, 924 F.3d at 805; Nichols, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109526 at *34. 
 4. Nichols, 924 F.3d at 805. 
 5. Id. at 806 n.1. 
 6. Id. at 806. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
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than a duty of her ‘regular occupation’ as ‘sanitarian.’”9 
Nichols sued reliance under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA), which creates a private right of action to recover insurance benefits.10 
Though the district court sided with Nichols,11 the Fifth Circuit ultimately held 
Reliance made a “fair and reasonable” determination.12 Nichols appealed, but the 
Supreme Court denied certiorari this fall.13 
This Note argues the terms “regular occupation” and “own occupation” in 
long-term disability insurance policies must be defined with reference to all of the 
material duties and conditions of a worker’s job. Part I explains the purpose and 
structure of long-term disability insurance. Part II details the circuit split over how 
to define “regular occupation” in cases like Nichols’. Part III presents the 
shortcomings of defining “regular occupation” in general terms and explains the 
importance of resolving the split in favor of a more specific definition. Finally, 
Part IV proposes several solutions to standardize the definition of “regular 
occupation” and bring administration of long-term disability insurance policies 
back into alignment with ERISA’s goals. 
I. WHAT IS LONG-TERM DISABILITY INSURANCE? 
Disability insurance protects future earnings.14 Many employers provide both 
short- and long-term disability insurance.15 Short-term disability insurance pays 
workers a portion of their salary when they are temporarily disabled from doing 
their job.16 Benefits are typically limited to three to six months and are used to 
compensate workers for income loss due to injuries like broken bones or other 
inherently temporary disabling conditions.17 
Long-term disability insurance kicks in after short-term benefits run out.18 
Despite its name, long-term disability insurance typically only provides benefits 
for two to five years.19 It is designed to be temporary: the policies are intended to 
provide much-needed financial support while a worker retrains and searches for a 
 
 9. Nichols, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109526 at *5. 
 10. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). 
 11. Nichols, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109526, at *11–12. 
 12. Nichols, 924 F.3d at 810. 
 13. Nichols v. Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., 140 S. Ct. 186 (2019). 
 14. TAMRA L. BARRACLOUGH ET AL., THE ADVISORS GUIDE TO DISABILITY INSURANCE 8 
(2016). 
 15. Id. at 59. 
 16. James Passamano, Beth Sufian & Karey Sopchak, Protecting Income and Health Coverage 
When a Worker Becomes Disabled, 55 HOUSTON LAWYER 16, 18 (2018). 
 17. BARRACLOUGH ET AL., supra note 14 at 60. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 63. 
5
Jasukaitis and O’Hara: Defining “Regular Occupation” in Long-Term Disability Insurance P
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2020
DEFINING "REGULAR OCCUPATION" 
215 
new job.20 
Typically, insurers offer two types of long-term disability insurance: “any 
occupation” and “regular occupation.” “Any occupation” disability insurance 
provides protection when a worker is disabled from doing any job.21 “Regular 
occupation” or “own occupation” insurance, on the other hand, provides benefits 
when the worker can no longer perform their particular job.22 
II. THE COURTS OF APPEALS DO NOT AGREE ON HOW TO DEFINE “REGULAR 
OCCUPATION.” 
Disagreement over how to define “regular occupation” has divided the courts 
of appeals for two decades.23 The Second and Third Circuits have long held 
“regular occupation” must be defined with reference to the actual requirements of 
a worker’s job.24 The Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits, however, accept more 
generic characterizations of jobs, even when those definitions do not capture all 
facets of a worker’s role.25 The following sections illustrate the different 
approaches to defining “regular occupation” by summarizing emblematic cases on 
each side of the circuit split. 
A. The Second and Third Circuits Define “Regular Occupation” in Terms of 
Workers’ Actual Job Requirements. 
Martha Kinstler was the director of nursing services at a small healthcare 
facility.26 Her role required her to stand approximately twenty-five percent of the 
work day and perform clinical duties for forty percent of the work day.27 Kinstler 
purchased a long-term disability insurance policy through her employer that 
 
 20. Id. at 61. 
 21. 4 Law of Life and Health Insurance § 8.03[1] (“Any occupation” disability insurance is 
also called “general disability” insurance.). 
 22. Id. at § 8.02[1]. “Own occupation” and “regular occupation” are interchangeable in the 
context of disability insurance policies. See Patterson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 763 Fed. Appx. 268, 
271–72 (3d Cir. 2019) (“equat[ing] ‘own occupation’ with . . . ‘regular occupation.’”); Osborne v. 
Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 465 F.3d 296, 300 (6th Cir. 2006) (stating the “relatively minor 
difference in language” between “own occupation” and “regular occupation” “does not warrant a 
different result.”). 
 23. See Kinstler v. First Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., 181 F.3d 243, 249 (2d Cir. 1999); see also 
Darvell v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 597 F.3d 929, 935 (8th Cir. 2010) (acknowledging “[t]he circuits 
are split . . . on this issue”). 
 24. See, e.g., Lasser v. Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., 344 F.3d 381, 386 (3d Cir. 2003); Kinstler, 
181 F.3d at 252–53. 
 25. See Darvell, 597 F.3d at 935; House v. Am. United Life Ins. Co., 499 F.3d 443, 452 (5th 
Cir. 2007); Osborne v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 465 F.3d 296, 299 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 26. Kinstler, 181 F.3d at 245. 
 27 Id. at 246. 
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provided benefits when the “[i]nsured cannot perform the material duties of his/her 
regular occupation.”28 
After injuring her knee in a car accident, Kinstler sought disability benefits 
under the policy. Though Kinstler’s physician said she could “not work in any 
capacity where she [was] expected to walk distances more than 50 feet 
repeatedly[,] carry loads, lift or climb,”29 Kinstler’s insurer relied on the opinion 
of a different doctor who determined Kinstler would be able to work so long as she 
was sedentary.30 
After determining the scope of Kinstler’s limitations, the insurance company 
turned to the DOT, which, as noted above, is a reference manual that catalogs jobs 
and their corresponding duties. The company categorized Kinstler’s occupation as 
“Director of Nursing.” Because the job duties associated with “Director of 
Nursing” in the DOT were largely sedentary and did not include direct patient care, 
Kinstler’s insurer refused to pay her benefits.31 The insurer argued that although 
Kinstler’s job required she perform direct patient care, those tasks were not an 
essential function of a “director of nursing” according to the DOT.32 
On appeal, the Second Circuit rejected the insurer’s argument and held 
Kinstler was improperly denied benefits.33 The Second Circuit recognized that 
although Kinstler’s job title was nominally the same as the job identified in the 
DOT, her “regular occupation” “must be defined as a position of the ‘same general 
character’ as her job, i.e., a director of nursing at a small health care agency.”34 
Thus, “even though at a large hospital, a director of nursing might have only . . . 
sedentary tasks,” Kinstler’s position required more activity.35 Under this 
understanding of “regular occupation,” the court reinstated Kinstler’s benefits.36 
B. The Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits Define “Regular Occupation” in General 
Terms. 
Decisions like Kinstler and others from the Second and Third Circuits are 
irreconcilable with decisions in the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits. Take for 
example the case of Juanita Nichols, discussed in this Note’s introduction. As 
previously explained, Nichols’ insurer, Reliance, denied her benefits when Nichols 
was diagnosed with Raynaud’s disease. Nichols sued and the U.S. District Court 
 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 246–47. 
 31. Id. at 247. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 252–53. 
 34. Id. at 253. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
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for the Southern District of Mississippi reversed Reliance’s determination, noting 
the insurer ignored “both common sense and the record evidence” when it denied 
Nichols benefits. The court held it was unreasonable to define Nichols’ occupation 
by relying solely on a single DOT entry that did not capture all of Nichols’ job 
duties.37 
The Fifth Circuit reversed, finding Reliance’s definition of Nichols’ regular 
occupation was supported by substantial evidence: the DOT.38 The court held that 
even though Nichols paid for “regular occupation” disability insurance, “Reliance 
did not need to account for every task Nichols performed,” it “merely needed to 
make a ‘fair and reasonable’ determination of whether Nichols’ disability 
precluded her from performing the material duties of her regular occupation.”39 
Not everyone agrees with this approach. Judges on both the Fifth and Sixth 
Circuits have published dissents from cases like Nichols’.40 These opinions echo 
the law in the Second and Third Circuits, explaining “regular occupation . . . in 
general[] means the individual insured’s usual and customary means of earning a 
livelihood.”41 Moreover, one judge explains, “regular occupation” “does not 
permit the insurer to define [disability] at an unreasonably high level of generality 
so as to offer the insured no real protection.”42 
The issue is not simply one of contract interpretation. Though contract 
language may differ slightly across insurance companies and between policies,43 
the core question remains how an insurer (or court) should determine what, 
exactly, constitutes an applicant’s “regular occupation.” Juanita Nichols’ policy 
states that her insurer, Reliance, would determine her “regular occupation” by 
referencing how “it is normally performed in the national economy, and not the 
unique duties performed for a specific employer or in a specific locale.”44 
Requiring insurers define the demands of workers’ occupations with reference to 
“the national economy” glosses over the central issue: Insurers can only identify 
how a job is performed in the national economy if it first identifies what the job is. 
Put another way, when we talk about defining “regular occupation,” we mean 
 
 37. Nichols v. Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109526, at *11–12 (S.D. 
Miss. June 29, 2018). 
 38. Nichols v. Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., 924 F.3d 802, 810 (5th Cir. 2019). 
 39. Id. at 812. 
 40. See, e.g., House v. Am. United Life Ins. Co., 499 F.3d 443, 456 (5th Cir. 2007) (Dennis, 
J., dissenting); Osborne v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 465 F.3d 296, 301 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(Cole, J., dissenting). 
 41. House, 499 F.3d at. at 462. 
 42. Id. at 462. 
 43. Compare Nichols, 924 F.3d at 806 n.2 (policy stated “regular occupation” determined in 
reference to how “it is normally performed in the national economy, and not the unique duties 
performed for a specific employer or in a specific locale”) with Kinstler, 181 F.3d at 246 (policy did 
not state how “regular occupation” would be interpreted). 
 44. Nichols, 924 F.3d at 806 n.2. 
8
Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 19 [2020], Iss. 2, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol19/iss2/5
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS 19:2 (2020) 
218 
both identifying the correct title and then, in turn, identifying the tasks and 
conditions necessary to do that job. For example, though Nichols’ insurance policy 
allowed her insurer to define her “regular occupation” with reference to the 
national economy, Reliance defined the wrong occupation. It classified Nichols as 
a “sanitarian (any industry).” Had Reliance looked at how poultry processors 
operate in the national economy, it would have determined cold exposure was, in 
fact, a necessary condition of Nichols’ work. 
C. As a Result of the Split, Outcomes for Workers with Identical Jobs, 
Disabilities, and Insurance Policies Vary. 
Judicial disagreement about the meaning of “own occupation” and “regular 
occupation” has led to an intolerable difference in outcomes for disabled workers. 
Insurers routinely define claimants’ regular occupations at a high level of 
generality, which allows them to deny benefits to people who are, in fact, disabled 
from doing their real-world jobs.45 Though some courts reject insurers’ 
interpretations of “regular occupation,” others blindly accept them. 
This practice can lead to disparate outcomes for workers with identical cases. 
Consider two large-animal veterinarians, each of whom has “regular occupation” 
disability insurance. Both suffer an injury that prevents them from the heavy lifting 
necessary to care for large animals. Insurers deny both veterinarians’ disability 
claims because, though they can no longer work with large animals, they can do 
the work of a general veterinarian.46 On appeals to the Second and Fifth Circuits, 
for example, the Fifth would uphold the insurer’s determination denying benefits, 
but the Second would find the veterinarian must be classified as a large-animal vet 
and reverse. The circuit split means workers with identical jobs, identical 
disabilities, and identical policies do not experience identical protections 
nationwide. This disparity is especially problematic under ERISA, which is meant 
to standardize the provision of employment benefits to U.S. workers. 
The veterinarian hypothetical closely resembles two actual cases involving 
lawyers. A trial lawyer and an environmental lawyer were disabled from working 
in their respective specialties.47 The Fifth Circuit denied the trial attorney benefits, 
 
 45. See, e.g., Darvell v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 597 F.3d 929, 934 (8th Cir. 2010) (insurer 
defined a door-to-door salesman as a sedentary “account executive” and denied benefits); Lasser v. 
Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., 344 F.3d 381, 386 (3d Cir. 2003) (insurer defined an orthopedic surgeon 
responsible for emergency surgery as a general surgeon and denied benefits); Kinstler, 181 F.3d at 
247 (insurer defined a nurse as “director, nursing service” even though she had direct patient care 
duties and denied benefits). 
 46. See DICTIONARY OF OCCUPATIONAL TITLES § 073.061-010 (4th ed. 1991) (defining 
veterinarian without reference to animal size). 
 47. Compare House, 499 F.3d at 447, with Doe v. Std. Ins. Co., 852 F.3d 118, 121 (1st Cir. 
2017). 
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holding the “distinction between ‘trial lawyer’ and ‘lawyer’ [is] too fine under a 
common sense interpretation of ‘regular occupation.’”48 The First Circuit, 
however, found it unreasonable to use the generic description of “lawyer,” “rather 
than a job description that fully . . . encompassed the material duties of [the 
lawyer’s] specialized area of legal practice”49 and awarded the environmental 
lawyer benefits. This judicial inconsistency results in different outcomes for 
similarly situated workers. 
III. “REGULAR OCCUPATION” MUST BE DEFINED WITH REFERENCE TO A 
CLAIMANT’S ACTUAL JOB REQUIREMENTS. 
There are two main problems with defining “regular occupation” without 
reference to the specific requirements of a person’s job. First, the main text on 
which insurers and courts rely when defining a worker’s “regular occupation” is 
deeply flawed. The DOT should not be used in benefit determinations. Its 
shortcomings are (at least) threefold: the DOT was not designed for use in 
disability determinations, it is based on flawed data, and it is obsolete. Blind 
reliance on the DOT distorts benefit determinations and makes it more likely a 
worker will be erroneously denied benefits. 
Second, these inaccurate determinations jeopardize the welfare of millions of 
Americans and make it harder to recover after disability-related job loss. 
Conversely, accurate determinations—those based on job definitions that capture 
all of a worker’s duties—provide workers with much-needed financial support and, 
in turn, encourage long-term economic stability. 
Legal intervention is necessary to remedy these problems. The insurers who 
draft and administer the policies at issue have an inherent conflict of interest: they 
have a fiduciary duty both to the beneficiaries of their plans and to their 
shareholders. Yet insurers consistently prioritize shareholders over workers by 
defining “regular occupation” broadly and denying otherwise viable claims. When 
courts allow insurers to define “regular occupation” generically, they tacitly 
endorse insurers’ refusal to balance these competing interests in good faith. 
A. The Dictionary of Occupational Titles Distorts the Adjudication of ERISA 
Disability Benefit Cases. 
As noted, some circuits rely on a single definition in the DOT to define a 
worker’s occupation.50 But the definitions do not accurately describe workers’ 
jobs, so use of the book unfairly distorts benefits determinations. As we now 
 
 48. House, 499 F.3d at 453. 
 49. Doe, 852 F.3d at 123–24. 
 50. Nichols v. Reliance Std. Life Ins., Co., 924 F.3d 802, 811–12 (5th Cir. 2019). 
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explain, insurers’ use and lower courts’ acceptance of the DOT is misplaced for 
three reasons: The DOT was never intended for use in disability determinations, it 
is based on bad data, and it is outdated. 
1. The DOT was Not Designed for Disability Determinations. 
The DOT was designed to help place people in jobs, not for use in deciding 
whether someone is disabled. The DOT catalogs information about more than 
12,000 occupations.51 Each entry includes a job title and a non-comprehensive list 
of duties performed by individuals in that type of job.52 
Until 1991, the DOT was used by employment counselors at the U.S. 
Department of Labor to match applicants with job openings.53 Other government 
agencies, like the Veteran’s Administration, also used the DOT to place workers 
in jobs.54 
The DOT itself recognizes it is not designed for use in benefit determinations. 
Its introduction directs users to “supplement [the] data with local information 
detailing jobs within their community.”55 The DOT acknowledges that its 
definitions “reflect[] jobs as they have been found to occur, but they may not 
coincide in every respect with the content of jobs as performed in particular 
establishments or at certain localities.”56 
The Social Security Administration (SSA), which adjudicates thousands of 
disability benefit claims each year, has come to realize that the DOT is not 
appropriate for use in disability determinations. Though the SSA uses the DOT as 
an aid in its determinations, the agency cautions that a “job title is never sufficient 
to identify [a person’s] occupation.”57 Instead, jobs are classified by “the title of 
the job as given by the claimant; possible alternative wording for the title; major 
tasks in the job; and the industry of the job.”58 
Although the SSA and some courts59 recognize that “occupation” must be 
defined in terms of a worker’s actual job duties (not with single-minded obedience 
to the DOT), private insurers continue to use the DOT to define “occupation” in 
 
 51. WORK, JOBS, AND OCCUPATIONS: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE DICTIONARY OF 
OCCUPATIONAL TITLES 1, 4 (Ann R. Miller et al. eds., 1980) [hereinafter WORK, JOBS, AND 
OCCUPATIONS]. 
 52. Id. at 4–5. 
 53. Id. at 5. 
 54. Id. at 45, 258. 
 55. DICTIONARY OF OCCUPATIONAL TITLES vii (4th ed. 1991). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Soc. Sec. Admin., Past Relevant Work – The Particular Job or the Occupation as Generally 
Performed, SSR 82-61 (2017), https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0425005025 
[https://perma.cc/F3LW-9FZM]. 
 58. Id. (emphasis added). 
 59. See, e.g., Lasser v. Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., 344 F.3d 381, 387 n.5 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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general terms, harming disabled workers. 
2. The DOT is Based on Flawed Data. 
The data underlying the DOT’s job definitions are flawed, so many of its job 
descriptions are inaccurate.60 The data used to compile the DOT’s job descriptions 
was primarily collected by field branches of the Department of Labor, which were 
staffed with employees from local state agencies.61 This decentralized staffing 
caused data collection problems because the national office lacked effective 
control over the field offices and could not standardize the process.62 For example, 
individual instructions from the national office on how to observe jobs “appear to 
have been insufficient and inadequate” as “[m]ajor steps in the job analysis process 
did not have sufficient guidance.”63 
Though insurers use the DOT as evidence of how jobs are performed 
nationwide, jobs were frequently observed in only one market, raising questions 
about whether industries or jobs were adequately researched.64 Some states limited 
researchers’ ability to travel outside of the state to observe jobs.65 Definitions based 
on limited observations do not represent the universal conditions of doing a job (to 
the extent universal conditions exist in any job). All of these problems suggest the 
DOT’s job descriptions do not reflect actual job duties and conditions in the real 
world. 
Problems with the DOT’s data go beyond its collection. When drafting the 
DOT, “definitions were written especially hurriedly, with the likely result that 
source data [was] not fully explored.”66 When updating the DOT for its fourth 
printing, significant time “was spent trying to verify or update third edition 
occupations.” As a result, data collection may not have “adequate[ly] 
cover[ed] . . . newly emerging industries and occupations.”67 These problems, too, 
undermine the DOT’s accuracy. 
3. The DOT is Obsolete. 
The DOT is badly out of date, yet insurers continue to rely on it, and some 
courts blindly accept its use. The DOT has not been updated since 1991 and is no 
 
 60. WORK, JOBS, AND OCCUPATIONS, supra note 51, at 316. 
 61. Id. at 100–01. 
 62. Id. at 101. 
 63. Id. at 145. 
 64. Id. at 116, 147. 
 65. Id. at 113, 119. 
 66. Id. at 146. 
 67. Id. 
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longer published.68 To make matters worse, more than a tenth of the job 
descriptions in the 1991 edition were not based on new data.69 Instead, the 
definitions were carried over from the previous edition, for which data was 
collected in 1965.70 These carry-over job descriptions are now fifty-five years old. 
As noted, the SSA takes into account a claimant’s actual job duties when using 
the DOT in disability determinations. The SSA recognizes the DOT is outdated 
because “[a] gradual change occurs in most jobs so that after 15 years it is no longer 
realistic to expect that skills and abilities acquired in a job . . . continue to apply.”71 
The SSA has thus recognized the need to replace the DOT with a new system “to 
make accurate [benefit] decisions.”72 
Because the DOT is a snapshot in time—from 1991 at best—it will only 
become less and less relevant and cannot evolve alongside industry. Though jobs 
may not disappear completely, the tasks required to perform them may become 
automated. Thus, though “working with robots, rather than being replaced by them, 
is likely to become the norm,” the DOT’s manufacturing titles will never be 
updated to reflect the need to supervise automated manufacturing.73 
The DOT’s obsolescence is particularly evident in jobs that have changed in 
light of the internet. For example, the DOT definition of news editor refers only to 
print duties, though many news sites are now exclusively online.74 
B. Defining Occupations in General Terms Unfairly Jeopardizes Americans’ 
Access to Disability Insurance Benefits. 
1. Millions of Americans are Covered by Long-Term Disability Insurance 
Policies that Contain the “Regular Occupation” Language whose Meaning 
Underlies the Circuit Split. 
One in four Americans become disabled from doing their job before age sixty-
five.75 To protect against disability-related job loss, about ninety million 
 
 68. Browning v. Colvin, 766 F.3d 702, 709 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 69. WORK, JOBS, AND OCCUPATIONS, supra note 51, at 156. 
 70. Id. 
 71. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1565 (2012). 
 72. The Need for Occupational Information, Soc. Sec. Admin., 
https://www.ssa.gov/disabilityresearch/occupational_info_systems.html [https://perma.cc/F3LW-
9FZM] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019). 
 73. See Jamie Condliffe, The Week in Tech: Some Workers Hate Robots. Retraining May 
Change That, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/19/technology/amazon
-automation-labor.html [https://perma.cc/R6MW-RUST]. 
 74. See Popovich v. Met Life Ins. Co., 281 F. Supp. 3d 993, 1007–08 (C.D. Cal. 2017); 
DICTIONARY OF OCCUPATIONAL TITLES, § 132.067-026 (4th ed. 1991). 
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Americans pay for long-term disability insurance.76 These policies are typically 
purchased by workers through their employers’ benefit plans and are governed by 
ERISA.77 Overall, forty-one percent of employers offer long-term disability 
insurance as part of their employee benefits packages; the proportion of large 
employers that offer it is much higher.78 
Many of these policies contain the “own occupation” or “regular occupation” 
language at issue in the circuit split. For example, the nation’s largest private-
sector employer, Walmart, offers long-term “own occupation” disability insurance 
to its 2.2 million employees.79 
Workers cannot avoid unfair benefit determinations under a “regular 
occupation” policy by shopping for a different policy with different language. 
Insurance markets are typically controlled by just a few providers; consumers 
generally have little choice and are subject to whatever policies those insurers 
offer. For example, employers purchase insurance plans for their employees 
through large-group insurance markets. In forty-three states, at least eighty percent 
of the large-group insurance market is controlled by just three insurers.80 In at least 
twenty-six states, three insurers control ninety percent of the large-group insurance 
market.81 Options for people seeking disability insurance in the individual 
market—that is, not through their employers—are similarly limited. In thirty-four 
states, a maximum of three insurers offer individual long-term disability policies.82 
In ten states, only one insurer offers individual coverage.83 
As a practical matter, then, a consumer cannot choose to purchase insurance 
from an insurer that is willing to pay disability benefits for a “regular occupation” 
disability claim in light of the worker’s actual job duties and conditions. Such a 
provider may not exist. Instead, a worker is likely stuck with insurers who define 
“regular occupation” in general terms, which leads to unjust benefit denials. If a 
 
 76. See Fred Schott, How Many Working Americans Have Adequate Disability Coverage?, 
COUNCIL FOR DISABILITY AWARENESS (Apr. 26, 2018), https://blog.disabilitycanhappen.org/ how-
many-americans-have-disability-coverage/ [https://perma.cc/6ZSF-KEK5]. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See Michelle Andrews, Why a Long-Term Disability Policy is More Important than Pet 
Insurance, NPR (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2017/10/11
/556946744/why-a-long-term-disability-policy-is-more-important-than-pet-insurance 
[https://perma.cc/8V2T-KB5X]. 
 79. Fortune 500, FORTUNE.COM, https://fortune.com/fortune500/2019/search
/?employees=desc (last visited Sept. 20, 2019); Long-Term Disability, 
https://one.walmart.com/content/usone/en_us/me/time/disability/long-term-disability.html 
[https://perma.cc/Q4T7-QTTL]. (last visited Sept. 20, 2019). 
 80. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE, ENROLLMENT 
REMAINS CONCENTRATED AMONG FEW ISSUERS, INCLUDING IN EXCHANGES 67–68 (2019), 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/697746.pdf [https://perma.cc/NS68-NAPD]. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 54–55. 
 83 Id. at 54–55. 
14
Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 19 [2020], Iss. 2, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol19/iss2/5
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS 19:2 (2020) 
224 
worker is one of the relatively few who has the resources and wherewithal to appeal 
an unjust benefit determination, the worker must live in a circuit that defines 
“regular occupation” in terms of workers’ actual job requirements to have any hope 
of obtaining benefits. 
2. Defining Occupations in General Terms is Contrary to ERISA’s Goals 
and Flouts the purpose of Long-term Disability Insurance. 
Defining workers’ jobs at a high level of generality, regardless of actual job 
duties and conditions, runs afoul of two of ERISA’s main goals: protecting workers 
and establishing uniformity. 
Congress enacted ERISA “to promote the interests of employees and their 
beneficiaries in employee benefit plans.”84 Defining occupations at their highest 
level of generality does not protect workers’ interests. Just the opposite: The 
practice makes it easier to deny claims and robs workers of needed benefits for 
which they pay a premium. 
ERISA also seeks to establish a uniform administrative scheme “to guide 
processing of claims and disbursement of benefits.”85 The circuit split undermines 
uniformity. For example, as already explained, the Fifth Circuit allows insurers to 
interpret “regular occupation” generically and categorize workers according to 
DOT entries, but in the Second and Third Circuits, that approach is considered 
unreasonable. There, insurers must define “regular occupation” in terms more 
closely tied to a worker’s actual job responsibilities and conditions. This variation 
is a far cry from the “uniform administrative scheme” ERISA envisions.86 
When courts define “regular occupation” and “own occupation” in general 
terms, they undercut the role of long-term disability insurance in rehabilitation and 
retraining. Despite its name, “long-term” disability insurance is designed to be 
temporary; it provides financial support between job loss and new work. Many 
policies provide benefits for only two to five years.87 Workers rarely need longer. 
The average claim lasts just over two and a half years.88 
The expectation is that while receiving benefit payments “the insured will 
 
 84. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983). 
 85. See Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 523 U.S. 141, 148 (2001). 
 86. See id. 
 87. See, e.g., Long Term Disability Insurance, METLIFE, 
https://www.metlife.com/insurance/disability-insurance/long-term/ [https://perma.cc/3AVX-6PHR] 
(last visited Oct. 17, 2019). For example, the nation’s second-largest private-sector employer, 
Amazon, caps long-term disability coverage at two years. See, e.g., Bigham v. Liberty Life Assurance 
Co., 148 F. Supp. 3d 1159, 1163 (W.D. Wash. 2015). 
 88. COUNCIL FOR DISABILITY AWARENESS, The Average Duration of Long-Term Disability is 
31.2 Months. Are You Prepared? (Jan. 18, 2016), https://blog.disabilitycanhappen.org/the-average-
duration-of-long-term-disability-is-31-2-months/ [https://perma.cc/F5FJ-BKXY]. 
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[make] the necessary adjustment to another line of work” or will qualify for 
continuing benefits under a general disability policy due to the severity of their 
impairment.89 When courts generalize claimants’ job descriptions, they rob 
workers of much-needed financial assistance, making it harder to pursue training 
and pivot to a new line of work. 
C. Accurate Benefit Determinations Prevent Harm to Workers and Bolster Long-
Term Economic Stability. 
1. Disabled Workers who are Denied Benefits Face Drastic Financial and 
Health Consequences. 
When courts allow insurers to deny benefits arbitrarily, they sow chaos instead 
of providing financial stability. More than half of Americans struggle to make ends 
meet in the wake of economic shocks like job loss.90 This is unsurprising given 
that almost half of Americans do not have enough savings to cover three months 
of living expenses.91 A 2014 study of consumer bankruptcy filings found job loss 
and medical bills are the two most common reasons consumer debtors file for 
bankruptcy.92 Disabled workers who are denied benefits face both. 
The stakes associated with benefit denials are higher than financial instability 
alone. A 2015 survey conducted by the American Psychological Association 
(APA) found money to be the country’s number one stressor, with nearly a quarter 
of adults rating their money-related stress as “extreme.”93 Financial uncertainty is 
correlated with depression, anxiety, and myriad other health concerns.94 
Individuals low on funds are also less likely to go to the doctor, which 
exacerbates or prolongs workers’ disabling conditions. Twenty-one percent of 
APA survey respondents said their budgets were so tight they considered foregoing 
 
 89. See McFarland v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 149 F.3d 583, 587 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 90. PEW CHARITABLE TRUST, THE ROLE OF EMERGENCY SAVINGS IN FAMILY FINANCIAL 
SECURITY: HOW DO FAMILIES COPE WITH FINANCIAL SHOCKS? 2 (2015), 
https://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2015/10/emergency-savings-report-1_artfinal.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9YPC-X2XT]. 
 91. Chances of Disability: Me, Disabled?, COUNCIL FOR DISABILITY AWARENESS, 
https://disabilitycanhappen.org/disability-statistic/ [https://perma.cc/M7N2-DX7X] (last visited 
Nov. 21, 2019). 
 92. Daniel A. Austin, Medical Debt as a Cause of Consumer Bankruptcy, 67 ME. L. REV. 1, 
21 (2014). 
 93. AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, STRESS IN AMERICA: PAYING WITH OUR HEALTH 2 (Feb. 4, 
2015), https://www.apa.org/news/press/releases/stress/2014/stress-report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FEH7-8RBX]. 
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or did forego a doctor’s visit in the last year.95 For unemployed people with 
disabilities, the choice between saving money and seeing a doctor may be 
especially fraught. 
Without access to benefits, disabled workers must find alternative sources of 
income. Ideally, they will retrain and reenter the workforce in jobs that provide 
pay comparable to their prior positions. Without the financial stability provided by 
long-term disability benefits, workers may be forced to seek new jobs—lower-
paying, less-skilled jobs—because they need immediate income.96 These lower-
paying jobs consume time and energy a worker might otherwise devote to 
retraining. When workers are forced to take a job just to make ends meet, it 
becomes even less likely they will successfully recover from disability-related job 
loss.97 
Unfairly denying benefits negatively affects the broader economy, too. When 
workers lose their jobs and lack sufficient savings, they suddenly need to cut back 
on spending, which removes money from the economy.98 
2. Defining Jobs Accurately Makes it Easier for Workers to Successfully 
Retrain and Go Back to Work. 
Workers are more likely to qualify for disability benefits when courts define 
their occupation consistently with the job’s actual requirements. Disability 
insurance benefits typically provide approximately sixty percent of a worker’s 
salary.99 Though not sufficient to completely replace one’s regular pay, the limited 
financial stability provided by disability benefits allows workers to pursue 
retraining.100 Retraining is critical to successfully bridging the gap between former 
and new employment. Data show early interventions, like the awarding of benefits 
 
 95. AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, supra note 93, at 3. 
 96. See Jack Kelly, The Frightening Rise in Low-Quality, Low-Paying Jobs: Is This Really a 
Strong Market, FORBES (Nov. 25, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jackkelly/2019/11/25/the-
frightening-rise-in-low-quality-low-paying-jobs-is-this-really-a-strong-job-market/#3784e8cd4fd1 
[https://perma.cc/G5MQ-9G29] (noting job seekers spend “an exceedingly long period of time 
searching for a suitable job [and receive] lackluster salary offers”). 
 97. See GOSTA ESPING-ANDERSEN ET AL., WHY WE NEED A NEW WELFARE STATE 111–12 
(2002) (“Once people have entered low-skilled jobs they find far fewer opportunities for upgrading 
their skills than are available to people in more skilled work. As a result, over time, they are likely to 
suffer an accumulating skill deficit.”). 
 98. See Allison Schrager & Quartz, The Growing Ranks of America’s High-Earning Poor, THE 
ATLANTIC (Nov. 3, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/11/income-rich-asset-
poor/413977/ [https://perma.cc/CV4Q-W9ZP]. 
 99. Kristen Monaco, Disability insurance plans: trends in employee access and employer 
costs, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (Feb. 2015), https://www.bls.gov/opub/btn/volume-
4/disability-insurance-plans.htm [https://perma.cc/QX6X-CM76]. 
 100. See McFarland v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 149 F.3d 583, 587 (7th Cir. 1993) (“[T]he insured 
will [make] the necessary adjustment to another line of work” while receiving benefit payments). 
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shortly after job loss, “may reduce the rate at which work limitations become 
career ending-disabilities.”101 
The earlier a worker starts retraining, the better. As a practical matter, this 
usually means starting to retrain just after job loss, though workers benefit most 
when they begin retraining even before they have left their prior positions.102 Even 
if overlap is impossible, quickly transitioning to a new job still matters. When 
people enroll in retraining programs within nine days of applying for 
unemployment benefits, they “end[] up working significantly more weeks, and 
earn[] more than workers who entered training a year or more after the job loss.”103 
Conversely, when there is delay in retraining of even one year, workers’ chances 
of finding new careers are often permanently hindered and their lifelong earnings 
limited.104 
Long-term disability insurance thus plays a critical role in helping workers 
transition to new work after job loss. When courts construe the terms “regular 
occupation” and “own occupation” generally, workers who are disabled from 
doing the only jobs their training and experience enable them to perform are denied 
benefits. These unjust denials stymie workers’ ability to pursue retraining and get 
back to work. Defining a worker’s “regular occupation” in terms of their actual job 
requirements and conditions, on the other hand, ensures that deserving workers are 
able to pursue new work without crushing financial stress. 
D. Insurers Have Little Incentive to Make Accurate Benefit Determinations. 
Insurers have little incentive to accurately define “regular occupation.” As 
discussed above, they have conflicting fiduciary duties: under ERISA, insurers 
owe a fiduciary duty to beneficiaries when administering plans,105 but, as a 
 
 101. David Autor, Mark Duggan & Jonathan Gruber, Moral Hazard and Claims Deterrence in 
Private Disability Insurance, 6 AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON. 110, 111 n.1 (2014). 
 102. Jeffrey Selingo, The False Promise of Worker Retraining, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 8, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2018/01/the-false-promises-of-worker-
retraining/549398/ [https://perma.cc/4KZF-AXPZ]. There are a variety of factors other than 
timeliness of benefits that affect access to retraining and can temper its efficacy. See generally id. 
(explaining barriers to retraining). Addressing those challenges is beyond the scope of this Note 
(though the authors want to emphasize it is critically important to address the shortcomings of job 
retraining programs, particularly given that more than 120 million workers in the world’s twelve 
largest economies may need retraining in the next three years alone as a result of automation. See 
ANNETTE LAPRADE ET AL., THE ENTERPRISE GUIDE TO CLOSING THE SKILLS GAP 2 (2019)). Though 
early retraining does not guarantee a successful career pivot, the fact remains the earlier workers 
receive benefits, the earlier they are likely to retrain and, thus, the likelier that retraining is to be 
successful. 
 103. Selingo, supra note 102. 
 104. Id.; see also Autor, Duggan & Gruber, supra note 101, at 111 n.1. 
 105. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (giving a fiduciary “authority to control and manage the operation 
and administration of [a] plan.”); 29 U.S.C. § 1133(2) (requiring a fiduciary to provide a “full and 
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corporation, they also owe a fiduciary duty to their shareholders to maximize 
profits.106 An insurer is simultaneously “responsible for administering [benefit] 
plan[s] so that those who deserve benefits receive them” and has a duty “to pay as 
little in benefits as possible to plan participants because the less money the insurer 
pays out, the more money it retains in its own coffers.”107 
Many insurance companies, including some of the largest in the world, have 
engaged in discriminatory denial of disability benefits.108 Unum, the largest 
American insurer specializing in disability insurance, recently engaged in a 
deliberate program to deny meritorious benefit claims in bad faith.109 At the end of 
each quarter, Unum required its claims managers to deny enough claims to meet 
financial goals, regardless of the merits of the claim.110 Fraudulent denials 
disproportionately affected benefit determinations of “so-called subjective 
illnesses,” the type typically hardest to prove, such as “chronic pain, migraines, or 
even Parkinson’s.”111 Numerous “scathing” opinions have similarly decried the 
practices of Reliance, a common litigant in these types of cases.112 One court went 
so far as to catalog all the opinions in which courts rejected Reliance’s benefit 
determinations,113 noting, “[t]hese opinions reveal that Reliance takes a range of 
extraordinary steps to deny claims for disability benefits.”114 
This comes as no surprise. Insurers benefit when “regular occupation” is 
defined in general terms. ERISA provides a private right of action to recover 
benefits due under a worker’s plan and a mechanism to enforce rights under the 
terms of a plan.115 ERISA does not, however, set out the standard of review for 
 
fair review” of the denial of benefits claimed under a plan); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 
489 U.S. 101, 109 (1989) (“ERISA . . . imposes a duty of loyalty on fiduciaries and plan 
administrators”). 
 106. See, e.g., Abatie v. Alta Health Ins., 458 F.3d 955, 966 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 107. Id. 
 108. See, e.g., John H. Langbein, Trust Law as Regulatory law: The Unum/Provident Scandal 
and Judicial Review of Benefit Denials Under ERISA, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1315, 1316–18 (detailing 
the systematic denial of ERISA administered disability benefits by Unum, one of the largest insurers). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 1318–19. 
 111. Id. at 1319. 
 112. See Hoff v. Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., 160 F. App’x 652, 654 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding 
that Reliance had “an illogical interpretation of [the claimant’s] policy and a corresponding failure 
to investigate the facts.”); see also Lasser v. Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., 146 F. Supp. 2d 619, 641 
(admonishing Reliance for “a level of care which . . . cannot be squared with the sensitive inquiry 
these important [] cases require.”); McDevitt v. Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., 663 F. Supp. 2d 419, 423 
(D. Md. 2009) (calling Reliance “blind or indifferent” to “the ultimate purpose of insurance . . . 
[which] is not to erect administrative barriers, increase transaction costs, or delay the payment of 
legitimate claims.”). 
 113. Nichols v. Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109526 at *15 n.79 (S.D. 
Miss. June 29, 2018). 
 114. Id. at *18. 
 115. 28 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 108 
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these actions.116 The Supreme Court has held “a denial of benefits challenged under 
[ERISA] is to be reviewed under a de novo standard unless the benefit plan gives 
the administrator . . . discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or 
to construe the terms of the plan.”117 Where the administrator retains authority to 
construe terms of the plan or determine benefits, as insurer-administrators often 
do, determinations are subject to an arbitrary and capricious standard of review.118 
Thus, insurers who make eligibility determinations likely receive a highly 
deferential standard of review in court. As a result, workers are unlikely to receive 
benefits because many courts blindly accept the DOT as reasonable evidence of a 
claimant’s job simply because insurers assert it is. 119 Indeed, plan administrator’s 
ability to “impose self-serving terms that severely restrict the ability of a reviewing 
court to correct a wrongful benefit denial” was part of the reason Unum was able 
to deny meritorious claims.120 
Moreover, traditional contract interpretation principles do not help workers in 
these cases. The contract may not be construed against the drafter-insurer where 
the insurer retains the ability to interpret “ambiguous” terms of the plan.121 When 
 
(1989). 
 116. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 489 U.S. at 109. 
 117. Id. at 115. 
 118. Id. at 109–10. 
 119. See, e.g., Darvell v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 597 F.3d 929, 934 (8th Cir. 2010) (insurer 
defined a door-to-door salesman as a sedentary “account executive” and denied benefits); Lasser v. 
Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., 344 F.3d 381, 386 (3d Cir. 2003) (insurer defined an orthopedic surgeon 
responsible for emergency surgery as a general surgeon and denied benefits); Kinstler v. First 
Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., 181 F.3d 243, 247 (2d Cir. 1999) (insurer defined a nurse as “director, 
nursing service” even though she had direct patient care duties and denied benefits). 
 120. See Langbein, supra note 108108, at 1316. 
 121. Fleisher v. Standard Ins. Co., 679 F.3d 116, 124 (3d Cir. 2012) (“Notably, every Court of 
Appeals to have addressed the issue has concluded that a court reviewing a benefits decision for 
abuse of discretion cannot apply the principle that ambiguous plan terms are construed against the 
party that drafted the plan.”); Marrs v. Motorola, Inc., 577 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2009) 
(“[A]lthough, generally, ambiguities in an insurance policy are construed in favor of an insured, in 
the ERISA context in which a plan administrator has been empowered to interpret the terms of the 
plan, this rule does not obtain.”) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)); D & H Therapy 
Assocs., LLC v. Boston Mut. Life Ins. Co., 640 F.3d 27, 35 (1st Cir. 2011) (“We have also noted that 
the doctrine of contra proferentem does not apply to review of an ERISA plan construction advanced 
by an administrator given authority to construe the plan.”) (internal citations omitted); Carden v. 
Aetna Life Ins. Co., 559 F.3d 256, 260 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that under circuit case law the court 
may not “curb the discretion given an administrator by a plan[.]”); White v. Coca-Cola Co., 542 F.3d 
848, 857 (11th Cir. 2008) (stating that “[w]e have rejected contra proferentem in ERISA appeals” 
because “arbitrary and capricious standard of review would have little meaning if ambiguous 
language in an ERISA plan were construed against the plan administrator.”) (internal citations and 
quotations omitted); Lennon v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 504 F.3d 617, 627 n.2 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Were 
this Court tasked with interpreting the language de novo, in view of the word’s apparent ambiguity, 
the rule of contra proferentum would apply.”); Kimber v. Thiokol Corp., 196 F.3d 1092, 1100 (10th 
Cir. 1999) (“We now hold that when a plan administrator has discretion to interpret the plan and the 
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courts allow “regular occupation” to be defined generically, insurers can 
manipulate benefit determinations in whichever way they see fit. In short, when 
courts allow insurers to define “regular occupation” with reference to a single DOT 
title, they become complicit in insurance companies’ manipulation of the system 
and abdicate their role as a check on company power in consumer relationships. 
E. The Benefits of Defining “Regular Occupation” with Specificity Outweigh the 
Potential Costs. 
Though defining “regular occupation” narrowly will afford more workers 
better insurance coverage when they most need it, expanding benefits in this way 
has costs. For example, increasing the specificity with which insurers define 
“regular occupation” may lead to more frequent payouts under the policies at issue. 
This increase in payouts may, in turn, result in increased premiums. Defining 
“regular occupation” narrowly may render these policies too expensive for lower-
income workers. 
One possible solution: employers could subsidize any increase in rates. The 
benefits of shouldering this financial burden outweigh the costs. Companies often 
use strong(er) disability protection as an attractive benefit to entice employees, and 
insurers often market it as such.122 Moreover, high-quality “regular occupation” 
insurance facilitates early intervention when tragedy strikes.123 This early 
intervention in turn facilitates employees’ returns to the workforce and decreases 
dependence on other benefit programs like social security disability insurance.124 
This cost-benefit analysis plays out the same way when conducted at the 
individual, corporate, and societal levels. The good that flows from defining 
 
standard of review is arbitrary and capricious, the doctrine of contra proferentem is inapplicable.”); 
Winters v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 49 F.3d 550, 554 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he Plan here states that 
the Plan Administrator [has the authority to construe provisions] . . . and the general rule of contra 
proferentem does not apply.”); Pagan v. NYNEX Pension Plan, 52 F.3d 438, 443 (2nd Cir. 1995) 
(“[A]pplication of the rule of contra proferentum is limited to those occasions in which this Court 
reviews an ERISA plan de novo.”). 
 122. Voluntary Benefits, RELIANCE STANDARD, https://www.reliancestandard.com/home
/products/voluntary-benefits/ [https://perma.cc/KF3W-8PVQ] (last visited Apr. 28, 2020) 
(describing voluntary benefits, like long-term disability insurance, as “high quality employee benefits 
programs [that] help attract and keep valuable employees.”); Should You Offer Group Disability 
Insurance to Your Employees?, THE HARTFORD, https://www.thehartford.com/business-
insurance/strategy/disability-insurance /offer-group-disability-insurance [https://perma.cc/3GBT-
7KKQ] last visited Apr. 28, 2020) (describing disability benefits as a “valuable addition to [] 
employee benefits package[s].”). 
 123. See Priyanka Anand & David Wittenburg, An Analysis of Private Long-Term Disability 
Insurance Access, Cost, and Trends, MONTHLY LAB. REV. (March 2017), 
https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2017/article/an-analysis-of-long-term-disability-insurance-access-
cost-and-trends.htm [https://perma.cc/GC5K-5FGF]. 
 124. Id. 
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“regular occupation” with specific reference to a claimant’s actual job duties 
outweighs any second-order effects such an interpretation may have on the 
insurance markets. 
IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
A. The Judiciary Should Advance a Uniform Legal Rule. 
Distortion in the market precludes the possibility of effective consumer 
advocacy and disincentivizes insurers from self-regulating. Outside intervention is 
required to bring administration of long-term disability policies back into 
alignment with the goals of ERISA. The Second and Third Circuits have already 
recognized this and implemented legal rules mandating insurers look beyond the 
DOT and take a claimant’s actual job duties and conditions into account when 
making benefit determinations.125 When the Supreme Court denied certiorari in 
Nichols v. Reliance,126 it foreclosed (for now) the possibility of such a judicially-
created rule on a national scale. 
The onus is now on other circuit courts to recognize the fundamental 
mismatch between the goals of ERISA and purposes of long-term disability 
insurance on the one hand, and the way in which insurers currently manipulate 
disability benefits on the other. Absent intervention from the legal system, workers 
will continue experiencing unequal levels of protection under identical insurance 
policies. Courts should require insurers look beyond a single DOT definition when 
defining workers’ “regular occupation” in disability benefit determinations. 
Mandating insurers account for workers’ actual job requirements—by looking to 
an individual’s job description, multiple DOT definitions, or other sources of 
information outlining the worker’s responsibilities—will ensure workers get the 
benefit of their bargain, i.e., insurance against loss of their own, regular 
occupation. 
Unless and until the circuits align themselves with the approach articulated in 
the Third and Second Circuits, intolerable differences will remain in how workers 
are treated state to state. That said, given the intractable nature of debate in the 
circuits to date, judicial intervention seems to hinge on the Supreme Court granting 
cert in a future case. 
B. Congress Should Legislate a Uniform Rule. 
Because the Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in a case presenting the 
 
 125. See, e.g., Kinstler v. First Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., 181 F.3d 243, 253 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 126. Nichols v. Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., 140 S. Ct. 186 (2019). 
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“regular occupation” question,127 the legislature now appears best-positioned to 
take action. Congress should mandate insurers account for actual job 
responsibilities when administering “regular occupation” disability insurance. 
ERISA has been amended a number of times since it was first enacted in 
1974.128 These amendments seek to control the actions of employers and plan 
administrators. For example, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 
prohibited employers from limiting the participation of new employees close to 
retirement in retirement plans.129 The same amendment also prohibited employers 
from freezing benefits for plan participants over sixty-five years old.130 The 
Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA) extended 
healthcare coverage for employees who had their benefits reduced.131 The Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act added additional responsibilities with 
respect to private health plans, including language dictating how insurers must 
treat mothers and newborn children.132 Amending ERISA to define “regular 
occupation” fits neatly into this legislative history. 
In fact, legislators have recently proposed major changes to ERISA.133 ERISA 
reform could explicitly endorse the legal rule from the Second and Third Circuits: 
“regular occupation” must be defined by the work a claimant was doing prior to 
disability, with reference to the conditions of that work.134 There is no doubt that 
such a rule would be administrable: it has worked for the past three decades in 
multiple circuits.135 Federal legislation controlling “regular occupation” disability 
insurance would ensure uniformity and fairness in benefit determinations. 
To ensure compliance and maximize effect, an ideal legislative solution would 
address the best practices for making benefit determinations, not just dictate what 
“regular occupation” means. Insurers should not be able to sidestep their duty to 
pay benefits owed under “regular occupation” plans simply by using language 
 
 127. Id. 
 128. See, e.g., Schmidt v. AK Steel Corp. Pension Agreement Plan, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144792, 
at *6 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 14, 2010) (explaining that “[w]hile ERISA has been amended several times 
since 1974, the cause of action and the right to recover has been an essential part of ERISA from the 
beginning.”). 
 129. History of EBSA and ERISA, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, 
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/about-ebsa/about-us/history-of-ebsa-and-erisa [https://perma.cc
/35PT-4WPL] (last visited Nov. 21, 2020). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id.; see generally 29 U.S.C. § 1161 (2012). 
 132. 29 U.S.C. § 1185 (2012). 
 133. See, e.g., Empowering American Workers and Raising Wages, 
https://elizabethwarren.com/plans/empowering-american-workers?source=soc-WB-ew-tw 
[https://perma.cc/CMY4-8Y65]. (last visited Nov. 21, 2019). 
 134. Lasser v. Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., 344 F.3d 381, 386 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Kinstler v. 
First Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., 181 F.3d 243, 253 (2d Cir. 1999)). 
 135. See Kinstler, 181 F.3d at 243. 
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other than “regular occupation” in their policies. That is, if the phrase “regular 
occupation” must be defined with reference to a claimant’s job responsibilities, an 
insurer should not be permitted to revise its policies and insert different language 
to escape accountability. A legislative amendment must consider the possibility 
that insurers will choose to write their contracts without reference to “own” or 
“regular occupation.” The best amendment to ERISA, then, would require insurers 
to look at the entirety of a worker’s job responsibilities, with reference to multiple 
sources, when determining whether a claimant is disabled from doing his or her 
job under long-term disability insurance policies. 
CONCLUSION 
There is an intractable circuit split over how to define the terms “regular 
occupation” and “own occupation” in long-term disability insurance policies. 
When courts allow insurers to define the terms generically, without reference to a 
worker’s actual job requirements, they flout the purposes of ERISA and jeopardize 
the welfare of millions of Americans. The DOT—the book on which courts and 
insurers rely when making these determinations—is ill-suited to the task. It was 
not designed for use in disability determinations, is “supported” by bad data, and 
is obsolete. In short, the current method of defining “regular occupation” in the 
Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits results in inconsistent and unjust benefit 
determinations. 
Power imbalance in the insurance market prevents consumers from 
negotiating contracts that better reflect their needs. Relatedly, market conditions 
disincentivize insurers from defining “regular occupation” with any level of 
specificity. As a result, the market does not allow participants to correct the 
problem themselves. Outside intervention is required to bring administration of 
long-term disability policies back into alignment with ERISA. 
Millions of Americans rely on long-term disability insurance to protect their 
income in the wake of unimaginable hardship. When insurers and courts refuse to 
deliver workers the benefit of their bargain, individuals, their families, and the 
larger economy suffer. 
While the Supreme Court recently declined to correct the intolerable 
difference in law among the circuits, the legislature now has an opportunity to 
amend ERISA and mandate insurers define “regular occupation” with specificity. 
24
Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 19 [2020], Iss. 2, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol19/iss2/5
